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The wager of faith in fiction and psychoanalysis: reading Colm Tóibín’s The Testament of Mary. 
‘Faith makes us, and not we it; and faith makes its own forms’. Ralph Waldo Emerson (1850).  
 
Abstract 
Colm Tóibín’s novella The Testament of Mary offers a provocative re-imagining of the Virgin Mary’s 
life twenty years after the crucifixion of her son Jesus. Drawing on Richard Kearney’s (2010) notion 
of anatheism or a ‘return to God after God’, I use the fictive space opened up Tóibín’s version of the 
Gospel as a spur to understanding the way in which faith may be conceived of as wager within both 
fiction and psychoanalysis. After discussing this in relation to themes of hospitality and alterity, I 
attempt to explore the annunciatory potential of the creative work of art and its significance for 
understanding alterity within psychoanalysis. I go on to illustrate the existential nature of  the 
psychoanalytic wager of faith with reference to Winnicott’s (1971) paper ‘The Use of an Object’, 
concluding with a brief discussion of the significance of testimony within psychoanalytic work.  
Introduction 
Climbing the north staircase to the friars’ cells in the 15th-century Dominican convent of San Marco 
in Florence, what seems at first to be a distant cloud of Mediterranean pinks, sepias and lustrous 
gold only gradually comes into focus. It is a scene at once familiar and extraordinary. The 
Annunciation, painted by Fra Angelico in 1450, is carefully positioned at the top of the stairs, 
allowing us to pause for a moment before the life-sized image depicting the Archangel Gabriel 
visiting the Virgin Mary to tell her that she is about to conceive the Son of God. Mary, dressed in her 
customary blue, is sitting modestly on a simple, wooden stool in a cloister with her hands crossed 
over her breast. Her head is bending reverently towards her radiant visitor whose magnificent, 
gleaming, multicolour wings announce his celestial status as emissary from God. Mary seems 
surprisingly calm and serene. Her gaze, focused on Gabriel’s eyes, gives little hint of surprise at being 
the recipient of such unexpected news. However, we might choose to read in the slight inclination of 
her body towards the angel, as if she is listening to words she cannot quite believe, a moment of 
hesitation as the full realisation of her divine duty becomes borne upon her. Of course, we know 
from St. Luke that Mary chose to accept her role as Mother of the Son of God, responding to the 
angel in the beautiful words of the Gospel: ‘Behold the handmaid of the Lord. May it be done unto 
me according to thy Word’.  
The frescoes at San Marco have been studied extensively by art historians, with numerous scholarly 
works (eg. Hood, 1993; Lloyd, 1998) documenting the power, subtlety and influence of Fra 
Angelico’s artistic and religious imagination. But by the time he was commissioned by Cosimo de’ 
Medici to decorate the newly-established convent of San Marco, Fra Angelico had already painted 
two different versions of the Annunciation. As Hodge (2006) points out, this particular fresco 
unusually lacks many of the symbols that were traditionally used to suggest the sanctity of the Virgin 
Mary. There are no white lilies to convey her virginity, nor does Gabriel appear to be interrupting her 
reading of the scriptures, a common artistic device used to index Mary’s piety. Indeed, unlike his 
previous, more elaborate and colourful paintings of the same scene, Fra Angelico seems to have 
made a deliberate decision to keep this version of the Annunciation as simple and spare as possible. 
We do not know the reason for this; but given the fresco’s central position in the convent, perhaps 
we might imagine that he wanted to allow his fellow friars maximum creative freedom to fill in the 
details themselves of what would have been a very familiar story; and to use the simplicity of the 
fresco as artistic inspiration for prayer, meditation and the practice of their faith. 
There can be few scenes from the Bible more frequently represented within Christian iconography 
than the Annunciation. That so many versions of Mary have appeared over the centuries is 
testament to not only to the imaginative appeal that she holds as Theotokos, or God-bearer, but also 
to the dearth of information we have about the life of this teenage mother from Nazareth. Of 
course, biography was not the concern of New Testament writers, who were interested simply in 
demonstrating the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecies. Nonetheless, as Warner (2000) points 
out, the absence of details about Mary’s life in the bible is a lacuna that has come to be filled with an 
accretion of myths and stories that makes her a figure ‘that has been formed and animated by 
different people for different reasons and is truly a popular creation’ (p. xxiv). All we do know, 
according to Christian theology and the work of artists such as Fra Angelico, is that there was a 
primal moment symbolised by her encounter with the angel where Mary was asked to make a 
choice. Faced with the angel and filled with doubt – St Luke tells us that Mary was ‘perplexed’ by the 
angel’s words – she nonetheless assents to her sacred duty: ‘may it be done unto me’. It is a 
courageous act of faith, in which she commits herself to the Holy Spirit and thereby becomes 
receptacle of the divine. Richard Kearney (2010) calls this decisive instant the ‘wager of faith’: where 
we respond to the Stranger with either hospitality or hostility; where we accept or refuse the advent 
of the sacred. It is the inaugural encounter with the other that sponsors the choice of faith. 
It is to this moment of wager that Colm Tóibín’s provocatively-titled The Testament of Mary returns 
us. In this brief, lyrical novella, also staged as a play, Tóibín offers a moving first-person account of 
the grieving Mary’s life in exile in Ephesus, twenty years after the crucifixion of her son. However, 
this newly-imagined voice of Mary has been seen by some as shocking, with both book and play 
deemed to be a blasphemous reworking of a sacred truth. The play’s opening on Broadway was 
marked by Catholic demonstrations denouncing it as “not only blasphemous but heretical. It presents a 
caricature of the Blessed Virgin Mary and implicitly denies all of the dogmas the Church has defined in her 
regard.” (Los Angeles Times, March 2013). Fictional re-workings of texts deemed to be sacred are of 
course scarcely new. They rarely receive unanimous praise and on occasions have been known to 
provoke violence. One of Tóibín’s best known predecessors, Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses 
(1988), resulted in the Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa in which he called for Muslims to kill Rushdie and 
his publishers. Philip Pullman’s more recent trilogy His Dark Materials, too, was roundly condemned 
by the powerful US-based Catholic League which campaigned successfully against the film version 
The Golden Compass, declaring it promoted atheism. Against this backdrop of wounded belief 
systems and book-burning outrage, it would be all too easy to read Tóibín’s novella simply as a kind 
of anti-Catholic political thriller in which a young rebel is transformed into a god via a band of misfit 
friends, hysterical fans and susceptible followers. I think this would be to miss the point of this artful 
and intensely thought-provoking book. For by inviting the reader to believe his fictional account of 
Mary’s life alongside an imaginative reconstruction of how her role as Mother of Jesus came to be 
written, I think Tóibín sets out to achieve two crucial and interrelated aims: first, to call the authority 
of texts normally held as sacred into question; and second, to thereby open up a space in which our 
traditional credos can be re-constituted or salvaged in the light of imagined alternatives. 
The power of Tóibín’s tale rests on his ability to create and sustain this fictive space in which a wager 
of faith becomes a vivid reality for the reader and constitutes the fulcrum on which his entire novella 
turns. In his re-imagining of a Mary who stubbornly refuses to believe that her son is the Son of God, 
Tóibín raises questions about the basis on which we have come to be inhabited by the story of that 
inner presence of the other deemed to be divine. However, the reception of otherness whose inner 
presence is constitutive of subjectivity, if not divinity, is equally a central preoccupation for 
psychoanalysis; and so in this paper, I want to suggest that the way in which Tóibín tells his story 
may have something to offer how we understand the notion of faith in psychoanalytic theory and 
practice. In setting out my thesis in this way, however, I must first recognise that the relationship 
between faith and psychoanalysis is almost as troubled as the relationship that exists between 
literature and psychoanalysis and may in fact have much in common with it. For just as 
psychoanalysis has traditionally attempted to subsume the field of literature in what Felman (1977) 
has called a ‘fight for recognition’ (p. 5), so too has psychoanalysis chosen in the past to claim 
priority over religion by emphasising its defensive function within the psyche. In ‘The Future of an 
Illusion’, Freud (1927) claimed that all aspects of religious life were ‘illusions, fulfilments of the 
oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind’ (p. 30) and that giving up our infantile need for 
the protection of an all-powerful father was the mark of emotional maturity. If, as Rieff (1966) points 
out, ‘Freud has systemised our unbelief’ (p. 40), it is scarcely surprising that the concept of faith has 
since struggled to find a foothold within psychoanalytic theory, despite Bion’s (1970) call for analysts 
to approach their work in a state of ‘faith that there is an ultimate reality and truth’ (p.31). More 
recently, however, there seems to have been what Starr (2008) calls a ‘gradual rapprochement’ 
between the two fields of study, where a cultural shift away from compliance with traditional 
religious doctrine towards respect for the individual’s own inner spiritual orientation has allowed 
both religion and psychoanalysis to acknowledge the role faith may play in psychic change and 
transformation. Contemporary psychoanalysts such as Eigen, (1999), Ghent (1999), Neri (2005), 
Safran (1999, 2006), Sorenson (2004) and Spezzano and Gargioulo (1997), amongst others, have 
integrated their theological interests with psychoanalytic theory alongside religious scholars such as 
Ostow (1995) and Zornberg (1995, 2002), writers who have drawn from psychoanalysis in their 
understanding of religious belief. 
In writing this paper, I have been mindful of the need to tread softly on territory that extends well 
beyond my usual academic and psychoanalytic comfort zone. It will be apparent to readers, for 
example, that I am not qualified to approach my topic from the perspective of theological 
scholarship; nor indeed can I claim any expertise in the history of art. My aim is somewhat less 
ambitious, and rests on a willingness to cross disciplinary divides in order to bring imaginative ideas 
from the domains of fiction and postmodern theology within the purview of existing psychoanalytic 
thinking. Such cross-fertilisation carries certain risks, yet I believe offers the potential for fresh 
insights and different ways of thinking that can refresh ideas and concepts that have become 
familiar over time. More specifically, I will use the illusory space of fiction that Tóibín opens up in 
The Testament of Mary as provocative spur to understanding the way in which faith may be 
conceived of as wager within both fiction and psychoanalysis. Developing my topic via Kearney’s 
(2010) notion of anatheism as well as through a discussion of hospitality and alterity, I will briefly 
draw on Winnicott’s (1971) paper ‘The Use of an Object’ to illustrate the existential nature of the 
psychoanalytic wager of faith. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of testimony 
within psychoanalytic work.  
The Testament of Mary. 
Tóibín sets his story within a story, situating Mary as necessary participant in as well as critical 
witness to the creation of a narrative that was to become central to Christian identity: the life and 
suffering of her son Jesus. We meet her when she is living in exile in Ephesus, twenty years after the 
violent death of her son. Now an elderly woman, traumatised by what she has seen and wracked by 
painful memories, Mary is tortured by her failure to save Jesus from his fate. She is guarded by two 
disciples of Jesus who are engaged in the onerous task of writing down a record of what happened 
to her son. They continually question her about the events leading up to the crucifixion, but she 
refuses to co-operate with the story they so clearly want to hear. For whilst Mary cannot read or 
write, she is all too aware that what is being written is a version of events that she does not 
recognise. ‘I have asked him to read the words aloud to me but he will not. I know that he has written 
of things that neither he saw nor I saw. I know that he has also given shape to what I lived through 
and he witnessed, and that he has made sure that these words will matter, that they will be listened 
to’ (p. 5). From the outset then, Tóibín’s novella is purposely framed as a vindication of Mary’s own 
testimony, offered in direct contrast to the words that will later become the basis of the New 
Testament. 
Tóibín imagines Mary’s story via a staging of three central events in the Gospels: the raising of 
Lazarus from the dead, the wedding at Cana where Jesus changes water into wine, and the final 
scenes at Calvary culminating in Jesus’s crucifixion. In St. John’s gospel, the miracle of the raising of 
Lazarus is presented at length and in detail as the final and most important sign that Jesus gives; it is 
this event that leads directly to the decision of Caiaphas and the Sanhedrin to kill Jesus. However, 
Tóibín’s reworking of the story places the raising of Lazarus much earlier in the story, and is framed 
as an event that Mary neither witnesses nor condones. Instead, she is deeply disturbed by the 
notion of bringing someone back from the dead: ‘no-one should tamper with the fullness that is 
death’ (p. 31). The description of the dead Lazarus being called back into life is presented not as 
miraculous but rather as a truly chilling event: ‘a figure dirtied with clay and covered with grave 
clothes wound around him began with great uncertainty to move […]It was as though the earth 
beneath him was pushing him and the letting him be still again like some strange new creature 
jerking and wriggling towards life’ (p. 35). 
Tóibín subsequently places Lazarus alongside Mary and Jesus at the wedding feast in Cana. The 
excitement of the guests at what has happened to Lazarus together with Jesus’s presence means 
that Mary and her son are now both in danger of being killed by the authorities. She tries to 
persuade Jesus to leave the wedding, but finds to her dismay that he ignores her: ‘he had begun to 
talk to others, high-flown talk and riddles, using strange proud terms to describe himself and his task 
in the world […] I heard him saying that he was the Son of God’ (p. 47).  Realising that she will not be 
able to save Jesus, she slips away from the wedding party and returns to Nazareth. The political 
unease at Jesus’s actions now takes on a more menacing quality and shortly after her return, she 
learns that her son has been taken by the Sanhedrin and is to be crucified. Mary agrees to go to 
Jerusalem for her own safety in the hope, too, of seeing Jesus and disguises herself to accompany 
the crowd to the crucifixion.  
It is here that Tóibín is utterly unsparing in his detailed portrayal of a scene filled with horror, cruelty 
and blood. This Jesus doesn’t suffer quietly or easily. He fights back; he screams with pain and 
writhes in agony as he is nailed to the cross. Mary forces herself stay and watch the dreadful, drawn-
out suffering of her son, steeling herself to be with him at the moment of his death. But in a startling 
reworking of the familiar Christian iconography of the Stabat Mater, Tóibín refuses to offer us any 
consolation. For here there is no grieving mother at the foot of the cross, no Pieta holding Christ’s 
dead, mutilated body across her knees, no Mater Dolorosa.  Tóibín’s Mary, in the midst of trauma, 
grief and terror nonetheless realises with great clarity that her own life is in imminent danger; and to 
save herself, she slips away before Jesus dies. Twenty years on, still brimming with guilt and 
remorse, she finally chokes out the frightful words that she has held back for so long: ‘For years I 
have comforted myself with the thought of how long I remained there […] But I must say it once, I 
must let the words out […] I would leave him to die alone if I had to. And that is what I did’. (p. 84).  
Following the crucifixion, and on the run with her guardian and Lazarus’s sister, Mary and her 
companion both dream of Jesus rising up from the earth along with water overflowing from a well. 
The dream is so powerful that Mary feels it acquires an almost tangible quality: ‘what happened in 
our dreams took on more flesh, had more substance, than our lives when we were conscious, alert, 
aware’ (p. 93). Indeed, it is this very tangibility – a measure of Mary’s own desperate desire for her 
son to return from the dead – that is subsequently written into biblical history by disciples who 
intend to make Jesus’s resurrection the linchpin of their new Christian theology. 
Mary remains consumed with guilt for the rest of her life. She is constantly badgered by her 
guardians to tell again the details of what happened, to add further nuances that will flesh out the 
story they want to hear, the story that she knows is not true. She protests that ‘I never saw his 
grave, I never washed his body’. But Mary’s testament is met with determined opposition, if not 
outright contradiction: ‘You were there,’ my guide said. ‘You held his body when it was taken down 
from the cross’. His companion nodded.’ (p. 99). As readers, we know that as Mother of Sorrows, 
Mary will be portrayed by artists for millennia to come at the foot of the cross, weeping over the 
body of her dead son. But in Tóibín’s version, Mary’s sorrow is a private grief, born of a sense of 
personal guilt that not only did she fail to protect her son from a humiliating and protracted death, 
but that she failed to stay with him to the end. 
By the end of the book, Tóibín’s Mary ends her days fearing that the men who are guarding her will 
be the ones who ‘thrive and prevail’ long after she is gone. She has refused to believe in the new 
story being constructed around the life and death of her son, a story written by men that will form 
the basis of the new Christian religion stretching across the world. Instead, she takes solace in a 
much older story still active in Ephesus: in the maternal cult of Artemis, the many-breasted Greek 
virgin goddess of mythology.  
Faith and fiction: Kearney’s ‘anatheism’. 
I have wanted to offer this brief summary of Tóibín’s story as a way of conveying the extent to which 
his novella is startling, even shocking, in its portrayal of Mary, not as Mother of God, but rather as 
subject in her own right. ‘New Testament figures’ claims Oppenheimer (2000) ‘do not really have 
interior lives. They are mythical types’. Whilst the traditional version of Mary allows us only to think 
of her in her capacity as receptacle of the divine, Tóibín deliberately sets out to unsettle, disconcert 
and surprise us into thinking about Mary as a person, as a subject, as a woman. For those whose 
religious faith rests on the text that Tóibín so powerfully re-imagines, it is challenging, even 
perturbing, to read. 
But Tóibín is not, of course, the only writer to make the radical attempt to rework our relationship to 
the God of traditional theology and it could be argued that his work emerges from a contemporary 
and postmodern cultural recasting of ‘strong’ metaphysical dogma. Derrida’s (1995) ‘religion without 
religion’, Caputo’s (2006) notion of ‘weak theology’ and Kearney’s (2001) return to a ‘God who may 
be’ are all concerned with subjecting the abstract, sacred, eternal, powerful God of traditional 
theology to doubt, re-interpretation, subjectivity and secularity. Kearney’s notion of anatheism, a 
‘return to God after God’, expresses a way of relating to the sacred in the wake of the social, cultural 
and intellectual ‘death of God’ announced by Nietzsche, Marx and Freud. As a philosophical 
response to our contemporary disillusionment with religion and the widespread desacralizing of the 
world, Kearney (2010) differentiates anatheism from dogmatic theism as well as militant atheism, 
refusing any absolutist positions either for or against the divine. Anatheism, proposes Kearney 
(2015), constitutes ‘a radical opening to someone or something that was lost and forgotten by 
Western metaphysics…and needs to be recalled again’ (p.3). It ‘signals a movement of return to what 
I call a primordial wager, to an inaugural instant of reckoning at the root of belief. It marks a 
reopening of that space where we are free to choose between faith or nonfaith. As such, anatheism is 
about the option of retrieved belief….Anatheism, in short, is an invitation to revisit what might be 
termed a primary scene of religion; the encounter with a radical Stranger who we choose, or don’t 
choose, to call God’ (p. 7).  
Kearney argues that one of the most potent ways of returning us to the moment of anatheistic 
wager is via the work of poets, writers and artists; those whose dramatic readings and 
interpretations allow us to enter imaginatively into the lives of people and events portrayed in 
biblical or other sacred texts and which offer the possibility of a return to the sacred moment of 
choice. The attempt to reposition faith in the light of our disenchantment with religious dogma and 
ideology is clearly part of Tóibín’s artistic project in The Testament of Mary, where his re-visioning of 
Mary’s life distances us from our traditional beliefs whilst at the same time offering us the potential 
for faith of a different order. Fiction’s capacity to bring into being imagined worlds is, of course, 
profoundly counterfactual. To read fictional literature is to believe, albeit provisionally, in the 
existence of characters and situations that we know don’t exist. In Tóibín’s story, we are asked to 
believe in the possible existence of his version of Mary and her account of events. While we are 
taken through her story, we believe ‘as if’ she existed in just the same way ‘as’ believers endorse the 
canonical account of her life in the Bible. It is by juxtaposing his hypothetical account of Mary’s life 
with the familiar account that he knows his readers hold that Tóibín not only offers us a Mary who 
wrestles with the putative divinity of her son, he allows us, while we read, to defer questions of 
belief and unbelief and identify with his version of Mary ‘as if’ it were true. We have been given 
poetic licence to suspend traditional religious belief, and accept ‘in good faith’ the very different 
version of events with which we are presented and which allow us to imagine otherwise.  
But by blurring the distinction between faith and fiction Tóibín also allows us to read Mary’s story ‘as 
if’ it were the Bible. Of course, the mimetic function of fiction releases possible worlds of belief and 
action that differ substantially from the claims to authority and universality made by the Bible. 
Stories from scripture cannot be read simply for the purposes of entertainment or make-believe; 
they point to an inner secret or hidden meaning which is conveyed, in part at least, by the very 
particular language deployed. Auerbach’s (1953) distinction between classical literature and the 
Bible points out that biblical language is deliberately brief and sparse, concerned with conveying 
only the decisive elements of a sacred narrative without the addition of superfluous detail. It is, as 
the King James version of the Bible perhaps best demonstrates, language at its most majestic; 
language making a claim to ultimate authority and truth. By contrast, Tóibín’s Mary tells her story in 
language that is simple, rhythmic and repetitive: language that is very different from the one being 
prepared for the Gospel account of events. Recall that Tóibín’s Mary is illiterate. Her words are not 
freighted with a background of concealed, sacred significance requiring theological interpretation. 
Rather, she uses words that are colloquial, informal, ordinary, maternal. Yet by offering the first-
person perspective of someone commenting on events privileged by sacred texts, Tóibín ensures 
that Mary’s fictive testimony competes with the testimony of the Bible to claim a similarly 
compelling authority.  
But if the fictive ‘as if’ enables us to read Mary’s version of events ‘as if’ it were the Bible, it also 
enables us to think of the Bible ‘as if’ it were fiction: ‘as if’ imaginative story rather than ‘as’ sacred 
text. For just as Fra Angelico’s artistic vision of the Annunciation gave his fellow monks imaginative 
free rein to fill in the details of the story, so too Tóibín’s story points to the necessary role of the 
imagination in all religious belief. Certainly, it could be argued that without imaginative re-
interpretations, the meaning of canonical texts becomes fixed or static, losing the vitality and 
immediacy required if they are to speak freshly to new groups and generations. This interpretative 
or fictive element in faith is located by Kearney (2010) in the cultural shift from ancient religious rites 
to their symbolic representation in the Greek tragedies. In these great early dramas, literal religious 
or sacrificial rituals were transmuted into powerful narratives during which the audience suspended 
their literal belief in the gods and heroes in favour of something figural or metaphorical. Such 
mimetic re-creation aimed at opening up a gap, a breach, between events and their dramatic re-
telling that not only ensured a certain distance or perspective from which to view the unfolding 
characters and situation, but also ensured empathy with those whose suffering was portrayed in the 
drama. Kearney suggests that the gap opened up by the fictional rendering of events transports us 
to the future anterior, to the undecidable space of what might have been. It is here, gripped by a 
story that demands emotional as well as spiritual engagement, that we are returned to the originary 
moment of wager where faith is once again a choice.  
It is surely no-coincidence that Tóibín himself has described how his idea for The Testament of Mary 
had its basis in an imagined visit by the disciple John to the theatre in Ephesus. He suggests that John 
was struggling to write his gospel and wanted to find the most powerful way of conveying the events 
surrounding Jesus’s crucifixion and death. The theatre, Tóibín suggests, was showing a play by 
Aeschylus, and it was this that caught John’s imagination: ‘..and then what he saw in the theatre 
lifted him out of his dilemma. His imagination soared with the crowd around him as, in some play 
that has been lost to us, he watched the enactment of a grieving woman imploring, crying out, and 
gaining power from her own voice. And then he watched someone seeming to return from the dead. 
The effect on the crowd around him and on himself was tremendous. Thus he found out what to do 
when he began to write his Gospel…He began to see the influence his writing might have….’ (Daily 
Telegraph, April 2014). This is, I think, an astonishing piece of imagination – or rather, of imagined 
imagination – where Tóibín speculates that the inspiration for St John’s account of the crucifixion, 
and his reasons for deciding to place Mary at the foot of the cross, might been inspired by watching 
a play, a Greek tragedy: and how John’s gospel story, soon to become the cornerstone of the new 
Christian religion, could itself have been derived from a piece of dramatic fiction. Rather than merely 
hollowing out religious texts in favour of an empty secularism, then, I see Tóibín’s Testament of 
Mary demonstrating the way we as readers and believers come to have faith in the power of story, 
the way stories inhabit us and become woven into the fabric of our lives. By re-telling and re-
imagining Mary’s story, Tóibín shows how the creative space of fiction can work to break these old 
stories open, acting as the cornerstone of a second faith that is different from our first, ‘naïve’ faith; 
one that allows us the freedom to imagine otherwise, to tell another story – the story of how things 
might have been.  
The wager of faith in psychoanalysis. 
What can we as therapists learn from Tóibín’s artistic re-visioning of the Gospel? What are the 
implications of the wager of faith in fiction for how we might understand any notion of faith in 
psychoanalysis? Indeed, how might we understand ‘faith’ in the first place? In order to sharpen the 
contours of these complex questions, we might do well to start with Treanor’s (2010) discussion of 
Kearney’s anatheism in which he attempts to distinguish between faith, belief and knowledge. To 
know something, he suggests, requires evidence or credentials that establish our knowledge as 
‘true’; whilst to believe something is to accept it without the need for any such verification. Faith, 
however, is different. It is a particular type of belief that includes a readiness to commit, to act: a 
wager on which everything is staked. ‘The distinction between belief and knowledge is epistemic’, he 
writes, ‘and has to do with how certain we are about a given proposition, while the difference 
between belief and faith is existential […] having to do with our commitment to live in the light of a 
certain proposition’ (p. 549). In this sense, as Treanor argues, faith may be considered different from 
knowledge in terms of what it is possible to verify, whereas faith may be considered different from 
belief in terms of what we are prepared to do: the extent to which we are committed, willing and 
able to take a ‘leap of faith’ that could change our lives.  
While it may be difficult to sustain Treanor’s separation of the epistemological and the existential 
aspects of faith – they are surely two sides of the same anatheistic wager – the distinction may be a 
useful starting point for our discussion. For Kearney (2010) seems particularly sympathetic to a faith 
that is characterised by a whole-hearted, imaginative and engaged orientation, not simply one that 
relies on proof or evidence. His notion of anatheism is primarily concerned with articulating a faith 
that rests more on transformation than on calculation. Tóibín, too, in his reworking of Mary’s life, 
points us towards the transformative potential of literature, where the fictive ‘as if’ of poetic licence 
vividly engages the reader in an existential rather than epistemological wager of faith. If we take Fra 
Angelico’s painting of the Annunciation as analogy, we might imagine Tóibín’s message – and those 
of other writers and artists – as akin to the beating of wings at the door heralding the arrival of the 
angel Gabriel; and the annunciatory potential of the creative work as awaiting entrance in the form 
of assent from an individual willing to hear what they might have to say.  
The existential wager here pre-eminently rests on the stance we take up in the presence of the 
creative work of art, the spirit in which we respond to the provocation of its message. The issue of 
reception is central. Is the message something to be accepted and welcomed – or refused and 
repudiated? There seems to be a link here, as Kearney (2010) notes, with ancient notions of 
hospitality. To offer hospitality to the Stranger is always to encounter the unfamiliar and to welcome 
what is new and different into our home or lifeworld. But hospitality does not only refer to concrete 
interactions with those we do not know. It refers, in metaphorical form, to a kind of attentiveness to 
‘otherness’ that includes a receptivity to that which is mystical or holy, and an openness to what is 
most unfamiliar or ‘foreign’ within ourselves and those with whom we come into relationship. For 
this reason, as Levinas (1969) intimates, the figure of the Stranger is always to be considered sacred 
by virtue of embodying something ‘other’, something different, something in excess of that which 
we can contain within ourselves. The etymology of the term hospitality, of course, is linked to two 
Latin words, the first of which, hostis, carries the dual meaning of both host but also stranger or 
enemy. The host is the one who lays down his or her weapons and welcomes the Stranger in a 
mutual relationship of trust. But hospitality is linked to a second, related term hospes, which 
contains within it the root word pot, meaning master, from which we get potestas or power. 
Hospitality, then, also contains within in the notion of power, where the host has the power to 
welcome or refuse foreigners or strangers into the home. Hospitality is thus a term of considerable 
ambiguity; it is never a given, never guaranteed, and our response to the Stranger, our willingness to 
grant him or her admission to our home, ultimately entails an existential wager of faith: that the 
other will turn out to be someone to whom we might want to listen, who is worth receiving – rather 
than somebody who is merely exploitative, greedy or murderous.  
The literary critic George Steiner (1989) argues for just such a spirit of hospitality when we are 
confronted with the message of writers and artists who try to give otherness creative form. Our 
attitude towards of the work of art, he suggests, requires a kind of an inner receptiveness or 
openness that I take to be constitutive of Kearney’s inaugural encounter: a rendezvous with alterity 
in which we do not read the novel so much as encounter it; in which we do not look at the painting 
so much as relate to it; and in which we do not listen to the song so much as feel it in our bones. 
Receiving the work of art in this way entails accepting its message ‘in good faith’, the kind of faith 
that is prior to any knowledge or calculation. It speaks of a relationship that St. Anselm characterises 
as fides quaerens intellectum, or ‘faith seeking knowledge’. It is akin to Derrida’s (2000) notion of 
‘absolute hospitality’, in which love of the host for the guest precedes and surpasses whatever we 
may come to know of him or her. Derrida’s (2000) messianic hospitality, a hospitality that is always 
‘to come’, ‘requires that I open up my home and that I give not only to the foreigner, but to the 
absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that I give place to them, that I let them come, that I let 
them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity 
(entering into a pact) or even their names’ (p. 24). In relation to the novel, the painting or the song, 
such hospitality is constituted by an existential moment of choice requiring a cordial open-
mindedness; a generous willingness to hear and engage with what the artist has to say in much the 
same way as we would be willing to hear the words of the Stranger we have invited into our home. 
Of course, not all strangers turn out to be divine. Literary, artistic or musical works are not all of 
equal worth, nor are they all equally accessible. Some may be formulated in ways that are remote or 
abstruse, and hospitality to the artist’s message may yet prove ill-founded if it turns out to be 
unintelligible or unrealizable. Disappointment and disillusion are necessary risks we must take, for 
‘without the gamble on welcome’, says Steiner (1989), ‘no door can be opened when freedom 
knocks’ (p. 156).  
Perhaps these ideas about our reception of the artistic message can help to think freshly about the 
reception of alterity within psychoanalysis. For when we read Tóibín’s story, just as when we see or 
listen to what the artist or composer has to say, ‘[w]e seek to make out’ as Steiner (1989) says, ‘the 
intelligibility, the claims upon us of his gestures and discourse. We realize full well that our 
comprehension, even as it deepens into intimacy, most particularly where it deepens into intimacy, 
will remain partial, fragmentary, subject to error and to revaluation’ (p. 176). The excess, the 
surplus, the sheer otherness that inheres within the novel or work of art finds its correlate in the 
alterity of the other whom we encounter within psychoanalysis, an otherness that will always 
exceed our capacity to know or penetrate its enigmatic core. In both cases, hospitality towards the 
other requires a conjectural, provisional sensibility that maintains a certain ‘negative capability’ 
entailing a praxis of expectant waiting: a ‘gamble on welcome’, as Steiner (1989) says, that precludes 
any rush to conviction or certainty.  
There is surprisingly little in the psychoanalytic literature that specifically addresses this ‘gamble on 
welcome’. A notable exception is Pascal’s wager on the existence of God that is discussed extensively 
by Lacan (2006a; 2006b) in Seminars XIII and XVI. Bearing in mind Treanor’s (2010) distinction 
between the epistemological and existential aspects of faith, however, I see Lacan’s deployment of 
Pascal principally as a means of indexing a calculative, epistemological wager based on what we can 
or cannot know of the symbolic ‘Other’. Here, I prefer to follow Kearney in privileging the existential 
issue of what we do in the face of alterity, our willingness to engage wholeheartedly with otherness. 
Writers such as Eigen (1999), for example, understand the patient’s faith as a quest for emotional 
intensity and authenticity within the psychoanalytic relationship: ‘a way of experiencing that is 
undertaken with one’s whole being, all out, ‘with all one’s heart, with all one’s soul, and with all 
one’s might’ (p. 3). These qualities of passion and commitment are also discussed by Ghent (1999), 
who seeks to develop an understanding of the role of emotional surrender in promoting a radical 
transformation of the self.  
The existential wager within psychoanalysis is perhaps best characterised in Winnicott’s (1971) 
seminal paper ‘The Use of an Object’.  It is exceptionally difficult, of course, to do justice to the 
richness and density of Winnicott’s thinking in any brief summary.  But reading his paper in the light 
of The Testament of Mary may help to clarify the aleatory nature of faith I am trying to elucidate 
here. For just as Tóibín returns his readers to a vivid, fictive space in which the choice of faith is once 
again a reality, so too, suggests Winnicott, is the patient in psychoanalysis returned to an illusory 
space of transitional experiencing in which there is an inaugural encounter with otherness. It is 
within this liminal area of transitional space that Winnicott outlines developmental processes that 
allow the infant to distinguish between what is ‘me’ and what is ‘not me’. This psychic re-calibration 
enables an awareness of the other beyond the infant’s omnipotent control. Crucially, however, 
otherness is never assured. It subsists not in demonstrable certainties, but rather in what I am calling 
here an existential, lived wager that its presence can and will be maintained despite the risk of its 
liability to loss and change. In his well-known discussion of the shift from object-relating to object-
usage, Winnicott (1971) points out that: ‘This thing that there is in between relating and use is the 
subject’s placing of the object outside the area of the subject’s omnipotent control; that is the 
subject’s perception of the object as an external phenomenon, not a projective entity, in fact 
recognition of it as an entity it its own right’ (p. 105). Discussing the astonishingly delicate and 
complex psychic negotiation that Winnicott goes on to imagine would take me beyond the scope of 
the present paper. What is significant here, however, is that the object’s very alterity sponsors 
destructive attacks in which we might say the subject wagers all on the existence and surviving 
presence of the other. The stakes are high, for ‘the experience depends’, warns WInnicott bleakly, 
‘on the object’s capacity to survive’ (p. 107). There is always the risk that the object may simply 
collapse, degrade or become useless, failing to break free of the subject’s omnipotent projective 
mechanisms. In this encounter with otherness, where the subject is gambling on ‘finding externality 
itself’ (p. 107), there can be no foregone conclusion, no certain outcome. Hospitality operates on the 
very knife-edge of hostility. Ghent (1999) vividly describes the phenomenology of the infant’s lived 
experience in the following terms: ‘One might imagine the subject saying to the object, “I went all 
out, completely vulnerable, in the faith that someone was out there – and it turned out to be true, as 
I could only have known by destroying you with all my might and yet here you are. I love you.”’ (p. 
214). I want to suggest that the full-blooded, ‘all out’ quality of commitment highlighted by Ghent 
indexes a faith in alterity that lies prior to any knowledge or understanding. Indeed, in ‘creating’ the 
object through destructive attack, the baby inaugurates, in fantasy, the very existence of an 
otherness which only later, and with some difficulty, it may come partially to know. We might say, 
going back to St. Anselm, that the baby’s ‘all out’ love is a form of ‘faith seeking knowledge’. It 
constitutes what I take to be the central psychoanalytic wager of faith in alterity itself: an existential 
– not calculative – wager that must be lived and repeated many times over before the resilience and 
survival of otherness can be felt, trusted and known. 
In such a brief outline, I have inevitably glossed over many subtleties in Winnicott’s thinking that 
bear much deeper discussion. The schematic framework above may be sufficient, however, to index 
at least some of the psychic co-ordinates at play within the psychoanalytic wager of faith. Perhaps it 
also serves to illuminate an issue with more weighty implications: how survival of the object could 
be thought of as symbolic of the survival of that inner presence of alterity many mystical traditions 
see as the basis of faith. Psychoanalysis has traditionally fought shy of such claims, preferring to 
assign our understanding of alterity firmly to the unconscious.1 Yet if we imagine, along with 
Winnicott, that our early, illusory experiences within transitional space lie at the heart of our adult 
capacity to enjoy and make use of the fictive ‘as if’ space within literature, drama, art and music, 
then we might also imagine these developmental experiences as paving a psychic path to our adult 
search for the sacred, however we conceive it. Indeed, we might remember that Winnicott (1971) 
regards the potential space between mother and baby ‘as sacred to the individual’ (p.121). It is 
possible, then, that our capacity to ‘imagine otherwise’ – a capacity to which Tóibín himself so richly 
attests – constitutes an umbilical cord linking us to the dimension of transcendence; to an originary 
experience of alterity or otherness that is more than we can ever encompass. In saying this, I do not 
mean to return us to religious faith any more than I think Tóibín does, though that is, of course, one 
of the choices open to us at the moment of wager. Rather, I am suggesting that religious faith may 
be woven from the same psychic yarn as the one spun early on in life; the one that knits otherness 
so hospitably within the self that it takes up residence as an inner, unseen guest, in whose presence 
we may come to have the capacity, as Winnicott later suggests, to be alone. 
Testimony: the psychoanalytic wager 
The capacity to be alone, to bear solitude, is the necessary precondition for the act of testifying or 
bearing witness to one’s truth. Felman (1992) writes: ‘To bear witness is to bear the solitude of a 
responsibility, and to bear the responsibility, precisely, of that solitude’ (p.3). Tóibín’s Mary is 
testifying to what she herself has seen and heard and it is clear that, despite the pressure from her 
                                                          
1 However, in a footnote to his paper, Ghent (1999) cites Rycroft (1966) who ‘observed that ‘there would seem to be no 
necessary incompatibility between psychoanalysis and those religious formulations which locate God within the self. One 
could, indeed, argue that Freud’s Id (and even more Groddeck’s It), the impersonal force within which is both the core of 
oneself and yet not oneself, and from which in illness one becomes alienated, is a secular formulation of the insight which 
makes religious people believe in an immanent God’ (p. 215).  
 
guardians, she will not give false witness: ‘Just as I cannot breathe the breath of another or help the 
heart of someone else to beat…I cannot say more than I can say’ (p. 4). By taking responsibility for 
speaking her truth, a truth that she and she alone can speak, Mary is placed in a uniquely precarious 
situation. 
But so too is the patient in psychoanalysis. In offering an account of his or her life to the analyst who 
listens, the patient is, like Mary, in the unique situation of bearing witness to his or her own story. 
Yet just as we cannot know the ‘truth’ of Tóibín’s version of Mary’s life, so too we cannot know the 
‘truth’ of our own. For if, as Freud (1923) suggests, our subjectivity is constituted by the presence of 
the other within, if the introduction of alterity into the ego precedes the formation of a self that 
may, one day, come to bear witness to its own personal truth, then any story that we subsequently 
come to tell about our lives is necessarily incomplete, estranged from itself from the outset. Indeed, 
psychoanalysis is predicated on the presence of an unconscious that alienates us from the conditions 
of our emergence as subjects. We are ‘fearfully and wonderfully made’, sings the psalmist in the King 
James Bible; we are shaped in ways we cannot know by the other who becomes the basis of a self 
and an unconscious we call our own but of which we are radically dispossessed. In this sense, the 
patient in psychoanalysis is asked to bear the responsibility of being witness to a truth that can never 
be owned, a truth to which he or she must constantly testify yet which is forever unavailable. ‘My 
account of myself’, writes Butler (2005) ‘is partial, haunted by that for which I can devise no 
definitive story’ (p. 40). And yet, as Tóibín’s imaginative retelling of Mary’s life shows, the 
undecidability of our account, its radical unknowability, does not necessarily refute the validity of 
any story we narrate though it may offer the potential for breaking it open. Its very undecidability is 
what opens up a fictive space that allows us the freedom to imagine the story otherwise and permits 
faith in the possibility of a different life – a different story – to thereby emerge. It is this space that 
returns us to the inaugural moment of choice where we are able to choose this story rather than 
another to be the one we allow to inhabit and nourish us. Perhaps this is precisely the ‘gamble on 
welcome’, the existential wager of faith we must risk if we are to undertake a psychoanalysis. 
By way of concluding, let us return to the end of Tóibín’s story. We find Mary back at home in 
Ephesus, listening to her guardians who are once again attempting to explain to her the importance 
of what has happened, of how her son will change the world. But now they insist on telling her 
about the circumstances of Jesus’s conception; a story that we as readers know will become the 
celebrated biblical version of the Annunciation, the one so vividly imagined – and re-imagined – by 
Fra Angelico and thousands of artists after him. But Mary will not listen. ‘I know what happened’ she 
tells us. ‘I know that my own happiness in those first months when I was with child felt strange and 
special, that I lived in way that felt different… Later, I learned that this is how we all prepare 
ourselves to give birth and to nurture, that it comes from the body itself and makes its way into the 
spirit and it does not seem ordinary’ (p. 100). 
Mary’s faith, we learn by the end of this remarkable book, lies not in the new God of Christianity, nor 
in any suggestion that her son Jesus was the Son of God. Her faith is the faith of a mother who 
believes only in what she remembers of her child. And so, instead of converting to the story being 
created by the disciples about Jesus’s divinity, Mary’s faith rests on the story she continues to tell 
herself about the human relationship she had with her son. Rather than believing in the inner, 
unseen presence of a deity, Mary movingly recalls the inner, unseen presence of her unborn child, a 
physical presence that she remembers ‘felt strange and special’. The ordinary, yet extraordinary, 
presence of otherness within is seamlessly transferred by Tóibín from the domain of the divine to 
the domain of the secular, where the simple story of a baby growing within the womb of its mother 
is imbued with the quality of the sacred. It is to these homely environs that Tóibín returns us, gently 
hinting – as does Winnicott too – that it is within the folds of the other that the vectors of faith are 
to be found.  
References 
 
Auerbach, F. (1953). Mimesis. The Representation of Reality in Western Literature. Trans. Willard R. 
Trask, Princeton University Press.  
Bion, W. (1970). Attention and Interpretation. London: Tavistock. 
Butler, J. (2005). Giving An Account of Oneself. NY: Fordham University Press.  
Caputo, J. (2006). The Weakness of God: a Theology of the Event. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press. 
Derrida, J. (1995). The Gift Of Death. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
Derrida, J. (2000). Of hospitality (translated by R. Bowlby). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Eigen, M. (1999). The Area of Faith in Winnicott, Lacan and Lacan. In: Relational psychoanalysis: The 
emergence of a tradition. Eds: Mitchell, S. and Aron, L. (1999), pp. 211–242. Hillsdale, NJ: The 
Analytic Press.  
Emerson, R. W. (1850). Representative Men: Seven Lectures. US: Belknap Press (1996), p. 101.  
Felman, S. (1992). Education and Crisis, or the Vicissitudes of Teaching. In: Felman, S. and Laub, D. 
(1992). Testimony. Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History. NY: Routledge. 
Felman, S. (1977). To Open the Question. Yale French Studies, 55–56, 5–10.  
Freud, S. (1927) The Future of an Illusion. In: J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 21, pp. 5-55. London: Hogarth.  
Freud, S. (1923) The Ego and the Id. In: J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans), The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 19, pp. 1–66. London: Hogarth. 
Ghent, E. (1999). Masochism, submission, surrender: Masochism as a perversion of surrender. In: 
Relational psychoanalysis: The emergence of a tradition. Eds: Mitchell, S. and Aron, L. (1999), 
pp. 211–242. Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press.  
Hodge, B. (2006). ‘The Goddess Tour: spiritual tourism/post-modern pilgrimage in search of Atlantis. 
In: The Politics of Contemporary Enchantment, Eds. Lynne Hume and Kathleen McPhillips, pp. 22-40. 
London: Routledge. 
Hood, W. (1993). Fra Angelico at San Marco. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Kearney, R. (2015). Anatheism. Returning to God after God. New York: Columbia University Press:  
Kearney, R. (2001). The God Who May Be. A Hermeneutics of Religion. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press. 
Lacan, J.(2006a). Le Séminaire. Livre XIII: L’objet de la psychanalyse. Ed. Michel Roussan. 
Unpublished. 
Lacan, J. (2006b). Le Séminaire. Livre XVI: D’un Autre à l’autre. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Seuil. 
Lloyd, D. and White, D. (1998). Fra Angelico. Phaidon Press; 2nd Revised edition. 
Neri, C. (2005) What is the function of faith and trust in psychoanalysis? The International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, 86:1, 79-97.  
Ostow, M. (1995). Normative religion versus illusion. In M. Ostow, Ed., Ultimate Intimacy: The 
psychodynamics of Jewish mysticism. Madison, Conn.: International Universities Press. 
Rieff, P. (1966). The Triumph of the Therapeutic. Uses of Faith after Freud. New York: Harper and 
Rowe. 
Rushdie, S. (1988). The Satanic Verses. London: Viking, Penguin. 
Safran, J. (2006) The Relational Unconscious, the Enchanted Interior, and the Return of the 
Repressed, Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 42:3, 393-412. 
Safran, J. (1999) Faith, Despair, Will, and the Paradox of Acceptance. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 
35:1, 5-23. 
Sorenson, R. L. (2004). Minding spirituality. Hillsdale NJ: Analytic Press. 
Starr, K. (2008). Faith as the Fulcrum of Psychic Change: Metaphors of Transformation in Jewish 
Mysticism and Psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 18:2, 203-229. 
Steiner, G. (1989). Real Presences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.                                
Spezzano, C. and Gargioulo, G. (2013). Soul on the Couch. Spirituality, Religion and Morality in 
Contemporary Psychoanalysis. New York: Routledge. 
Sweetman, B. (2011) A Gabriel Marcel Reader. St. Augustine’s Press: Indiana.  
Treanor, B. (2010). The Anatheistic Wager: Faith After Faith. Religion and the Arts, 14: 547-560. 
Winnicott, D. (1971). Playing and Reality. London: Penguin. 
Warner, M. (2000). Alone of all her sex. London: Vintage. 
Zornberg, A. (1995). The beginning of desire: Reflections on Genesis. New York: Doubleday. 
Zornberg, A. (2002). The particulars of rapture. New York: Doubleday.  
  
